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INTRODUCTION
A financial crisis is typically associated with a rise in the volatility of most
assets. Moreover, if the crisis is “contagious”, things become even worse for
investors because correlations among asset returns also increase and
diversification becomes less efficient than during quiet periods. As most
identified financial crises have been positively tested for contagion (Loretan
and English (2000), Hartmann et al. (2001), Bekaert et al. (2005)), this problem
warrants close attention.
To reduce investors’ excessive exposure to crisis effects (Chow et al.
(1999)), this study builds “crisis-robust” portfolios, i.e. those exhibiting the
least change in volatility during crises. Such portfolios enable investors to
minimize as much as possible the perverse effects of volatility caused by a
crisis. Holding a crisis-robust portfolio is an alternative to a regime-switching
asset allocation (Ang and Bekaert (2002, 2004)), which implies recognizing
early signs of a crisis and switching regimes appropriately1. In this respect,
a crisis-robust portfolio is less demanding; and therefore safer, for the investor.
As far as possible, crisis-robust portfolios are supposed to eliminate the
need to rebalance asset allocations according to the climate in the financial
markets. Choosing a crisis-robust portfolio not only reduces transaction costs;
it means that investors do not have to worry constantly about changing their
allocations. Furthermore, it is difficult to adapt portfolios to the changing
volatility/correlation picture in a timely manner because most crises occur
suddenly.
In practice, crisis-robust portfolios can help asset managers respect a
risk threshold fixed by their clients or publicly announced along with a fund's
objectives. Indeed, the risk thresholds produced by our model ensure that
crisis periods interfere as little as possible with a portfolio's composition and
risk. This is an innovation, since funds guaranteeing a maximal risk level
typically evaluate that risk using time intervals that are long enough to be
dominated by non-crisis subperiods.P6
Although general, the concept of crisis-robust portfolio is especially
appealing when applied to markets that exhibit the mixed effects of crises
on volatilities and correlations. Typically, these markets are characterized by
a so-called flight-to-quality (FTQ) effect (i.e. all volatilities increase but the
correlations between the safest and the riskiest assets decrease). Empirical
work has detected this effect between bonds and stocks and among also
bonds (Bekaert et al. (2005), Berben and Jansen (2005)), while stocks seem
to be subject only to contagion (correlations rise).
Thus, contrary to the stock market, the bond market offers an FTQ trade-
off during crises that can be exploited to keep portfolios as crisis-insensitive
as possible, the optimum being the crisis-robust portfolio.
One might think that crisis-robust bond portfolios are composed solely of
the highest quality securities, i.e. developed countries' sovereign bonds and
highly rated corporate bonds, because the volatility of investment grade bonds
is low, even during periods of turmoil. However, FTQ effect undermines this
argument. The fact that investors shift from risky to safe securities during
crises (Beber et al. (2006)) causes a decline in the correlations between risky
and safe assets during such periods (Stivers and Sun (2002), Baur and Lucey
(2006)). This is good news for diversification benefits.
Regarding bond portfolios, crises tend to increase volatilities and decrease
correlations between highly rated and speculative bonds. Therefore, thanks
to more effective diversification, a bond portfolio including some high yield
bonds –but not too many, for volatility reasons– may withstand crises better
than a 100%-safe portfolio. The empirical part of this study is devoted to
assessing the extent of this phenomenon, that is, to measuring the fraction
of risky assets devoted to optimally “robustifying” the portfolio against financial
turmoil.
Regarding the consequences of crises, therefore, bondholders are better
placed than stockholders, who are subject to harmful contagion. Indeed,
bondholders benefit from an FTQ-linked risk trade-off. Crisis-conscious bond
portfolio managers should therefore take this into account. The crisis-robust
Crisis-Robust Bond PortfoliosP7
approach is one way to fully exploit this trade-off in order to keep portfolios
as crisis-insensitive as possible.
In the empirical part of this study, we have identified seven financial crises
between 1998 and 2007 on the basis of the literature. The full dataset is
composed of weekly returns of government (GVT) and corporate bond indices
in the U.S. and in the Eurozone. Corporate bonds are split into investment
grade (IG) and high yield (HY) categories. We therefore deal with six different
assets. First, we show that the FTQ has a key effect in the bond class. Indeed,
the two correlation matrices (U.S., Eurozone) show that diversification benefits
rise during troubled times in four cases out of six. Accordingly, in these cases,
the crisis-robust portfolio includes the lowest-grade asset, confirming the
impact of the volatility trade-off.
The study is organized as follows. Section I defines crisis-robust portfolios
in a general framework and furnishes their analytical expression in a simple
two-asset setting. Section II presents the original bond-market dataset,
explains how crisis periods have been delineated, and documents the presence
of FTQ. Section III applies the crisis-robust concept to this dataset. Section
IV concludes.P9
I. CRISIS-ROBUST PORTFOLIOS
Because financial markets can be unpredictable, both in crisis periods
and in quiet periods, the crisis-robust portfolio is defined as the one minimizing
the volatility ratio between the two types of period.
Consider the following model. There are two possible regimes: the crisis
regime C and the quiet regime Q, but the probabilities of these regimes are
unknown. A crisis is therefore seen as a totally unpredictable event that affects
the markets.
The market includes n risky assets. The stochastic return vector
is taken randomly from either the crisis-period multivariate distribution with
covariance matrix or the quiet time distribution with covariance matrix .
Crises happen exogenously2 but investors are "crisis-conscious" (Kole
et al. (2005)), i.e. they know that crises are possible. However, they have no
prior information on the probability of occurrence. A rationale for the impossibility
of inferring the probability of a next-day crisis could stem from the fact that
crises are highly erratic, so the probability is unknown and, in most cases,
unknowable.
Let , be the composition of portfolio P made up of
n assets, where denotes the proportion of asset i in P. The variance of this
portfolio depends on the regime:
(2.1)
during crises
during quiet timesP10 Crisis-Robust Bond Portfolios
The crisis-robust portfolio P* is defined as the one minimizing the variance
ratio between the two regimes:
(2.2)
Its composition, denoted by , with , is thus such
that:
(2.3)
With a crisis-robust portfolio, the investor minimizes the need to rebalance
the asset allocation. Thus, a crisis-robust portfolio reduces transaction costs,
all other things being equal. However, the benefits associated with crisis-
robustness are likely related to the style of the portfolio manager. For active
investors who react even to minor signals, looking for a crisis-robust portfolio
makes little sense since they adapt to any changes they perceive on the
market. Conversely, passive investors with a diversified portfolio should be
keenly interested in finding a way to avoid –or at least weaken as much as
possible– the impact of a financial crisis on their wealth.
The optimization in (2.2)-(2.3) may be performed on any set of financial
assets provided that the two-regime setting in (2.1) is assumed. Numerical
software may then be used to find the appropriate asset allocation. However,
to determine the robust portfolio analytically in a simple case, we will assume
from now on that the market is composed of two assets having volatilities
during quiet times, and during crises. The correlation
coefficient between the returns of the two assets is during quiet times,
and during crises. We also introduce parameter representing the ratio
of these correlations:
(2.4)P11
The position of with respect to unity is left unconstrained. It may either
be larger than one in case of contagion or smaller than one when FTQ arises.
Therefore, the chosen parameterization will make it easier to conduct further
discussions involving FTQ-specific issues.
To obtain tractable analytical results we assume that the crisis has the
same relative impact on both assets' volatilities, that is, their crisis-to-quiet
time volatility ratios are equal. We consequently introduce parameter for
this common ratio. This parameter takes values larger than unity since crises
are associated with a rise in volatility:
(2.5)
Short positions are excluded. The two-regime variance (2.1) of portfolio
P including a proportion of asset 1 and, consequently, proportion
of asset 2, may be expressed as follows:
(2.6)
The first order condition for minimizing the ratio leads to:
(2.7)
If , meaning that the correlation changes during crises, then the
condition simplifies to:
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or equivalently:
(2.9)
so that the unique portfolio allocation fulfilling the first-order condition associated
with the crisis-robust criterion is given by3 with:
(2.10)
However, as illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 for several point values of the
parameters in question, this critical point may well correspond to a maximal
value of the volatility ratio as well as to a minimal value depending on the
sign of coefficient defined as:
(2.11)
The sign of indicates whether the two assets are subject to contagion
or to FTQ . In the first case, the critical point corresponds to a maximal
value and is therefore useless. Conversely, when the crises are associated
with a decorrelation of the assets, then the critical point provides the optimal
composition for a crisis-robust portfolio. Proposition 1 summarizes this result.
Proposition 1: If the market is made up of two assets such that
and , then the ratio reaches an interior minimum
for P = P* composed of of asset i .P13
Figure 1
Variance in crisis / variance in quiet period
The variance ratio is calculated as a function of
forP14 Crisis-Robust Bond Portfolios
Figure 2
Variance in crisis / variance in quiet period
The variance ratio is calculated as a function of
for
Portfolio P* is thus the crisis-robust portfolio. Its existence is ensured
thanks to the downward shift in the correlation, which compensates, at least
to some extent, for the rise in the volatilities of the two asset returns. In the
case of contagion, such a compensation effect is impossible and the minimal
ratio is obtained for corner solutions, i.e. portfolios made up of a single asset.
What is the efficiency of the crisis-robustness criterion? In other words,
how close to one is the optimal variance ratio ? Replacing and
by their expressions and computing both variances yields:
(2.12)P15
The next proposition follows from this equation.
Proposition 2: If the market is made up of two assets such that
and , then the minimal ratio is equal to 1 if and
only if .
When FTQ is present, the correlation spread between crisis and quiet
period, , is negative and creates a volatility trade-off. Proposition
2 exhibits the threshold to be reached by this correlation spread in order to
allow for full compensation, making the volatility of the crisis-robust portfolio
totally insensitive to crises. Indeed, we have:
(2.13)
By definition, and , then is always negative. However,
in practice, the correlation gap is generally insufficient ( ) to lead to
the existence of a portfolio that is totally insensitive to crises4. Consequently,
crisis-robust portfolios should be seen as second-best choices.
On Figure 1, all chosen values of are such that . Therefore,
none of the represented curves reaches the level of one for the volatility ratio
corresponding to a fully crisis-insensitive portfolio. Note that the result is not
influenced by the quiet period volatilities of the two assets but only by the
crisis-to-quiet period ratio .
Conversely, on Figure 2, for , the curve presents a minimum
value with a unit ratio, while for the volatility ratio can be lower than
one. This is an unrealistic situation to be avoided, making the volatility during
crisis periods smaller than in quiet times.P16 Crisis-Robust Bond Portfolios
II. DATA, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
AND CORRELATION MATRICES
Government and Corporate Bonds
The period under study stretches from July 1998 to May 2007. The dataset
is composed of weekly returns of the sovereign and corporate bond indices
of two geographic zones: U.S. and Eurozone. Corporate bonds are split into
IG and HY.
GVT bonds are represented by the 10-year benchmark indices supplied
by Datastream5. These indices, which include coupon returns, are usually
based on a single bellwether, namely the last bond issued by the country's
Treasury in a given maturity. Factors such as liquidity, issue size and coupons
are also taken into account when choosing the index component(s). For
corporate bonds, two categories of index were used: IG, with ratings between
AAA and BBB-, and HY, rated from BB+ to CCC. These indices exclude
convertible bonds and include coupon returns. Data are sourced from Merrill
Lynch (i.e., bids quoted by traders at the ML desk) at the market close6.
Figures 3 presents GVT bond prices, Figure 4 draws all corporate bond
prices. HY bond indices decreased sharply between 2000 and 2002 in the
aftermath of the stock market collapse. Indeed, HY default rates reached
historical peaks at that time. Starting from 1.6% in 1998, they reached 5.1%
in 2000 and finally 12.8% in 2002 (an historical high on the period 1971-
2006). The HY market also recovered very rapidly after 2002. In 2003, the
default rate declined to 4.7%, causing a complete change in the HY performance
trend at that date. The particular episode of 2000-2002 explains why globally,
for the period 1998-2006 under review, the HY bond index underperforms
IG bond returns, showing a negative risk premium to less risky assets.P17
Figure 3
Government bond prices
Cumulative weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007P18 Crisis-Robust Bond Portfolios
Figure 4
Corporate bond prices
Cumulative weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007P19
Crises studied
Our definition of "crisis" is broad. It encompasses five types of event:
currencies, sovereign debt, bond or equity crash, corporate bankruptcies
(Enron, WorldCom), and crises of confidence (9/11). We have deliberately
omitted crises of a purely banking nature and economic crises such as
recessions or oil shocks. The real difficulty lies in establishing precise
timeframes for the crises we have selected.
Table I shows the start and end dates of the crises studied in this article.
They have been chosen carefully on the basis of previous research (see
Appendix). Admittedly, while the onset of a crisis is usually easy to identify,
the end date is much harder to pinpoint. This awkward problem is highlighted
by the Asian crisis studied by several authors.
Table I
Crises used in this studyP20 Crisis-Robust Bond Portfolios
Descriptive statistics, correlations and volatilities
Table II provides descriptive statistics on returns (in local currencies) for
all assets in the database, for the whole period (July 1998 - August 2006).
All returns have been tested for stationarity (but the results are not reported
here). The annualized mean return of GVT bonds is around 4.8%. IG corporate
bonds exhibit somewhat larger returns with a risk premium between 108 and
164 bp while their volatility does not show higher values.
Surprisingly, the mean returns of HY bonds are lower than those of IG
bonds, and in the case of Europe, even lower than the return on GVT bonds.
The most probable explanation for this, as already mentioned, is the presence
in the sample period of a huge breakdown (2000-2002) on the HY bond
market, leading to a sharp increase in the default rate.P21
Table II
Descriptive statistics for returns: All bonds, whole period
Weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007
*Germany for GVT bond indices.P22
Tables III and IV give the descriptive statistics for crises and quiet periods,
respectively. Logically, as testified by their average returns, corporate bonds
suffer much more from crises than do GVT assets. In fact, HY bond returns
exhibit negative mean returns during crises.
As crises are the exception rather than the rule, the quiet period statistics
generally resemble the whole period data. Nevertheless, the anomaly regarding
the risk premia over the whole period (i.e. riskier bonds having smaller mean
returns) disappears in the quiet-period dataset (Table IV), testifying to the
impact of crises on this stylized fact.
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Table III
Descriptive statistics for returns: All bonds, Crisis period
Weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007
*Germany for GVT bond indices.P24
Table IV
Descriptive statistics for returns: All bonds, quiet period
Weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007
*Germany for GVT bond indices.
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Tables V and VI provide the correlation matrices for, respectively, the whole
period, the crises, and the quiet period. In all cases, sovereign and IG bonds
exhibit positive correlations. The same is true within the HY bond class.
However, correlations between HY bonds and the other categories take values
between 0.61% and 29.97% during quiet periods. Most of the time they drop
sharply during crises, reaching values comprised between -6.15% and 34.59%.
The FTQ effect during crises is clearly observed among bonds.
Table V
Correlation matrix: U.S. bonds
Weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007
Panel A: Whole period
Panel B: Crisis period
Panel C: Quiet periodP26
Table VI
Correlation matrix: E.U. bonds
Weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007
Panel A: Whole period
Panel B: Crisis period
Panel C: Quiet period
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Finally, as the theory has shown (see Propositions 1 and 2 in Section 2),
correlation spreads and volatility ratios are key elements in determining crisis-
robust portfolios. This information is provided in Tables VII to IX, respectively,
thus helping to measure the effects of crises on volatilities and diversification
benefits.
Table VII
Correlation spread matrices*, U.S. bonds
Weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007
*Differences between correlations in crisis and correlations during quiet periods.
The cells in grey correspond to the presence of FTQ (correlation decrease).
Table VIII
Correlation spread matrices*, E.U. bonds
Weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007
*Differences between correlations in crisis and correlations during quiet periods.
The cells in grey correspond to the presence of FTQ (correlation decrease).
Table IX
Volatility ratios*
Weekly returns in local currency, July 1998–May 2007
*Crisis volatility over quiet-period volatility.P28
Tables VII and VIII show that FTQ is observed in four out of six cases,
meaning that crises lead to lower correlations. For instance, on the U.S.
market during turmoil, the correlation between sovereign and IG corporate
bonds declined more than 8%, from 93.27% to 86.59%. Likewise, the decline
in correlation between sovereign and HY bonds reaches 11.14% while intra-
corporate bonds (IG and HY) show some contagion (+4.62%). This could
mean that, during crises, U.S. bondholders consider public debt as the only
really safe asset. Be that as it may, Tables VII and VIII testify to the simultaneous
occurrence of contagion and FTQ in the bond market, thus confirming the
relevance of our two-correlation-regime approach.
Table IX shows that volatility ratios in our dataset all lie between 1.46 (for
GVT bonds in Europe) and 2.26 (for HY bonds in the U.S.). Not surprisingly,
the ratios take the largest values in the HY bond category. The two-asset
theoretical model in Section 2 assumes a constant ratio. While this hypothesis
is clearly not met for every pair of assets, it seems still realistic for U.S. and
E.U. sovereign and IG bonds at least. Crisis-robust portfolios can however
be determined empirically in all cases. The drawback of not respecting the
constant volatility ratio hypothesis is that neither the existence nor the
uniqueness of a crisis-robust portfolio is guaranteed by the theory.
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III. DETERMINING CRISIS-ROBUST BOND PORTFOLIOS
For each geographical zone, we determine the crisis-robust portfolio made
up of two or three assets. In the two-asset case, only one parameter is required
for indicating the portfolio composition. Consequently, it is possible to represent
the portfolio volatilities in both regimes, as well as their ratios, as functions
of the proportion of an asset in the portfolio.
Take for example the case of U.S. GVT and HY bonds. Figure 5 shows
that both volatility curves are U-shaped and thus reach a minimal risk value
for a certain proportion of HY bonds in the portfolio (69.91% during calm
periods, 50.14% during crisis periods). The volatility ratio is trickier7 but still
reaches a minimal value at an interior point of the 0%-100% interval. Precisely,
the crisis-robust portfolio has a volatility ratio of 1.55 and includes 12.68%
of HY bonds. Consequently, HY bonds are indeed present in the crisis-robust
portfolio. However, this portfolio is not fully crisis-insensitive since the minimal
ratio remains above the unit value.P30
Figure 5
Volatility during the quiet period and during a crisis, and volatility ratio:
U.S. portfolios (GVT and HY bonds)
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More generally, Table X offers the results for the various possibilities
of two –or three– asset U.S. and E.U. portfolios. In each case, we determine
the crisis-robust bond portfolio from the standpoint of a domestic investor.
Table X indicates (left column) the assets allowed in the portfolio, then the
presence or absence of the FTQ effect. The latter piece of information is
derived from Tables VII or VIII depending on the geographical zone in question.
In accordance with the theory, the two cases of no-FTQ effect correspond
to corner solutions: 100% IG bonds in IG-HY U.S. portfolios, 100% GVT
bonds in GVT-IG E.U. portfolios.
Table X
Composition of the crisis-robust portfoliosP32
When the FTQ effect is present, the U.S. and E.U. portfolios differ from
one another by the respective proportions of the riskiest asset required to
reach crisis-robustness. While European investors find their optimum with
small proportions (2.8%, 4.9%), U.S. investors need much larger proportions
(12.7%, or even 59.3%). Moreover, the optimal ratio is more advantageous
for Europeans, as it is (slightly) closer to unity, the best ratio being 1.45 for
the E.U. and 1.52 for the U.S.
The difference between the U.S. and Euro portfolio composition is probably
attributable to the 2000-2002 “anomaly” mentioned earlier. In fact, in the U.S.
during quiet times, IG bond volatility appears lower than sovereign bond
volatility (0.77 < 0.94, see Table IV). According to Proposition 1, the share of
asset 1 volatility in the sum gives the proportion of asset 2 in the crisis-robust
portfolio. Even if the results in Table X do not stricto sensu obey the theory
(because the volatility ratio is not constant), Proposition 1 is still a good proxy
for the composition of the crisis-robust portfolio. The same “anomaly” occurs
in Europe, too, but only in the GVT-IG case, where the FTQ effect does not
appear. Conversely, the HY European bonds exhibit greater volatility than do
the two other classes. As these cases correspond to the occurrence of the
FTQ effect, only relatively small amounts of HY bonds are to be included in
crisis-robust portfolios.
Note also that, in both the U.S. and the Eurozone, putting the three assets
together does not make the optimal portfolio more crisis-robust. Since the
theory is restricted to the two-asset case, we cannot infer the generality of
this observation. But, on the basis of this stylized fact, we conjecture that
only a few securities exhibiting FTQ effects would be required to (partially)
hedge a portfolio against financial turmoil.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Several past events have pointed to the necessity for investors to take
into account the possibility that financial crises may occur. That said, each
crisis has its own pattern: some start slowly, others abruptly; some are short,
others last longer; some hit specific assets, others are general. Therefore,
waiting for a crisis to erupt in order to rebalance a portfolio is hazardous. So
this study offers the concept of a crisis-robust portfolio, that is, a portfolio
exhibiting the lowest volatility ratio between turmoil and quiet periods. Our
work highlights the somewhat paradoxical result that introducing risky assets
into a portfolio can “hedge” against a rise in volatility during crises. This result
is established analytically as well as empirically. In a two-asset framework,
the presence of the riskiest asset in the crisis-robust portfolio is solely linked
to the occurrence of a flight-to-quality (FTQ) effect, namely an asset decorrelation
during crises.
The empirical application provided here is rather simple, aimed at illustrating
the fact that crisis-robust portfolios can include a substantial fraction of risky
assets when FTQ is observed instead of contagion. In this respect, the bond
market offers a natural arena for examples. Other cases of FTQ have also
been identified, in particular in the bond-stock correlation (Hartmann et al.
(2001), Baur and Lucey (2006)). Therefore, a natural extension of this work
would be to test crisis robustness in the case of larger portfolios that also
include stocks. Indeed, contagion and its unpleasant consequences for
portfolio management have been now extensively described. But surprisingly,
little attention has been paid to the benefits that can be obtained by overweighting
assets whose correlations decrease during crises. Actually, acknowledging
the FTQ effect helps reduce the perceived “drama” surrounding financial
crises. More empirics are obviously needed to gauge the size of FTQ on global
financial markets.
Crisis-robustness is, however, a debatable criterion for portfolio management,
for several reasons. First, in this framework, the investor does not choose
the level of risk as such. As safer assets tend to be less influenced by crisesP34
than highly risky assets, a crisis-robust portfolio will be low-risk overall, but
not necessarily the one with the minimal risk over the whole period or under
a given regime. In this respect, the investor’s classic level of risk aversion is
replaced by an aversion to higher volatility during crises.
Second, crisis-robustness concerns volatility only. The fact that returns
decrease during crises is not taken into account. Further research could
investigate the distorsions of the risk-return relationship during crises and
check whether the volatility gains associated with crisis-robust portfolios are
adversely affected by return costs. The intuition is that the result would depend
on the level of investors’ crisis-awareness. In markets where portfolios are
generally composed in a single regime setting, crisis-robust portfolios offer
free hedging, whereas in two-regime markets, recognized by investors and
integrated in their optimization along the lines of our model, asset pricing
would incorporate the pricing of the hedge.
Third, crisis-robustness is formulated here in relative terms, as a ratio
between the volatilities in the two regimes. Other formulations involving, for
example, the frequency of a crisis or some kind of weighted average volatility
level, could lead to better criteria. A ratio has been chosen here for simplicity
but our main goal was to advocate looking for a crisis-conscious investment
rather than having to scrutinize the market each morning and decide whether
or not to change the portfolio's composition.
Going further on this issue would require a more general theoretical
framework for investors’ fears and attitudes regarding crises. In this respect,
behavioral finance (Malkiel et al. (2005), Bourachnikova (2007)) has shown
that people tend to overestimate the probability of detrimental but rare events.
By not introducing the probability of a crisis occurrence into our model, we
provide a theoretical approach compatible with any view (rational or not) about
the possibility of a crisis. Moreover, constraints could be added to the proposed
optimization, such as a maximal level of volatility in either of the given regime,
or even in both.
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Finally, the model in this study is static since no composition update is
considered. This is of course a major limitation, because extensive evidence
of highly unstable correlations can be found in econometric papers
(Engle (2002), Goetzmann et al. (2005)). Further research could therefore
consider a dynamic counterpart, including for instance a two-regime random
correlation coefficient.P37
NOTES
1 “Because the regime is not observable, the estimation involves inferring
from the data which regime prevails at each point in time” (Ang and
Beckaert, 2004, p.89).
2 In this respect, the applications of the model are widely open as no crisis
specification is needed. Indeed, different portfolio management styles may
be sensitive to different crisis types.
3 Other solutions may exist if the no-short selling condition is waived.
4 However, in theory, it can happen that two interior portfolios are crises-
insensitive because the correlation gap is so huge that it overcompensate
the variance growth. In such a situation, as a matter of fact, the variance-
ratio minimization is inappropriate due to the fact that the denominator
may exceed the numerator.
5 For Eurozone, the German bond index.
6 The indices have minor differences. For investment grade indices, we
selected a maturity of 7 to 10 years. However, for HY indices, maturity
was not proposed as a selection parameter, so there are small differences
in duration. Furthermore, the geographical indices for both IG and HY
securities have median ratings that may vary slightly. Moreover, the number
of index components varies from one country to another.
7 If the assumptions made in the theoretical part were fully satisfied, this
curve would also exhibit a U-shape. This is not the case since the GVT
bond volatility ratio is 1.56 while the HY one is much larger (2.26).
Nevertheless, a numerical optimisation can always be performed.P39
APPENDIX: CRISES SELECTED FOR STUDY
In this study, we examine five types of crisis: (1) currency crises,
(2) sovereign debt crises, (3) crises triggered by an equity or bond crash,
(4) corporate bankruptcies or loss of confidence (e.g. the collapse of Enron),
and (5) crises of confidence arising from severe external events (e.g. 9/11).
• Currency crisis
Brazil 1999
Dungey et al. (2002) say that the crisis began on January 13, 1999 with
the devaluation of the real. It is hard to establish an end date because no
landmark events occurred. However, the crisis is generally referred to as
the "January 1999 Brazilian crisis". We have therefore taken the final date
to be the end of January 1999.
• Sovereign debt crises
Russia 1998
The Russian crisis began on August 17, 1998, when the country defaulted
on its debt, and continued until September of that year, when another
crisis was triggered by the collapse of the hedge fund LTCM. We have
therefore considered these two crises jointly, setting the end date for both
at the end of the LTCM crisis.
Argentina 2001
The crisis began on the November 1, 2001 when Argentina announced a
debt restructuring plan. On December 5, the IMF refused to release funds
to help the country, and the Argentine president was forced to resign on
December 20. On December 23, 2001, the country announced that it wasP40
in default. For investors, the announcement marked the end of the crisis,
and emerging spreads began to narrow (BIS, March 2002).
• Crashes
e-crash 2000
Triggered by the crash in tech stocks, the equity meltdown began on
March 28, 2000. We have dated the end of the crisis to April 14, 2000,
when prices stopped falling. Thereafter, the market entered a period of
stagnation.
• Corporate bankruptcies and crises of confidence
LTCM 1998
The hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LCTM) collapsed on
September 23, 1998. Dungey et al. (2002) consider that the crisis ended
when the U.S. Federal Reserve decided to cut interest rates in order to
contain the fallout. The Fed's decision was taken unexpectedly between
two FOMC meetings on October 15, 1998.
Enron 2001
The onset of the crisis can be dated to November 28, 2001, when Moody's
Investor Services decided to downgrade Enron, taking it from IG to HY. Although
it was Moody's decision that sparked the mood of wariness which spread to
all financial markets, signs that Enron was in trouble had emerged much earlier.
On October 16, 2001, the company lowered its earnings guidance (BIS (March
2002)), and on November 8, it announced a retroactive adjustment to all its
results since 1997. Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2. It is extremely




The crisis related to the bankruptcy of WorldCom began on June 25, 2002,
when the company revealed accounting inaccuracies concealing losses
of $3.8 billion in 2001 and 2002; it also announced 17,000 job cuts,
equivalent to 20% of the workforce. WorldCom filed for bankruptcy on
July 11, and its share fell 80% over the next four months. Once again it
is very hard to establish an end date because the loss of confidence was
exacerbated by fears relating to terrorist attacks in May and June 2002
and to political tensions between India and Pakistan. According to the
BIS (September 2002), the most significant crisis-related market movements
occurred between July 10 and 23. We therefore consider that the crisis
lasted until end-July 2002.
• Other crisis of confidence
9/11
The terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001 sparked a crisis
of confidence across markets worldwide. It is hard to say precisely when
the crisis ended, but we have considered that it lasted for the whole of
September.P43
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crises better than a 100% - safe portfolio.
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